In this paper, we propose a security model to capture active attacks against multipath key establishment (MPKE) in sensor networks. Our model strengthens previous models to capture more attacks and achieve essential security goals for multipath key establishment. In this model, we can apply protocols for perfectly secure message transmission to solve the multipath key establishment problem. We propose a simple new protocol for optimal one-round perfectly secure message transmission based on Reed-Solomon codes. Then, we use this protocol to obtain two new multipath key establishment schemes that can be applied provided that fewer than one-third of the paths are controlled by the adversary. Finally, we describe another MPKE scheme that tolerates a higher fraction (less than half) of paths controlled by the adversary. This scheme is based on a new protocol for a weakened version of message transmission, which is very simple and efficient. Our multipath key establishment schemes achieve improved security and lower communication complexity, as compared to previous schemes.
S ENSOR networks consist of large numbers of wireless sensor nodes which have only limited memory as well as limited computational and communication capabilities. The sensor nodes are usually distributed randomly in a certain area for data acquisition and environment monitoring. After deployment, they operate unattended and without physical protection. They need to communicate with each other to accumulate data and (possibly) relay the data to a base station. In many applications, such as battle field surveillance, communications between sensor nodes have to be encrypted. At the same time, sensor nodes deployed in a hostile environment are prone to be captured and compromised.
A commonly studied key management approach for sensor networks is key predistribution, which installs cryptographic keys in sensor nodes before the nodes are deployed. Later, after the sensor nodes are deployed, they discover shared keys with their neighboring nodes (i.e., within the wireless communication range of the nodes). If two nodes are in each other's communication range and they share a common key, then they can encrypt the messages between them using the shared key, and hence, establish a secure link. A large number of key predistribution schemes have been proposed in the literature, e.g., [8] , [3] , [14] , [2] , [15] , [7] , [17] .
A key predistribution scheme does not guarantee that each pair of nodes share a predistributed key. For two nodes A and B that do not share a key, they can establish a path key using a secure multihop path between them. On such a path, each two consecutive nodes have a secure link. A can transport a key K to B via this path. On each hop, K is transported using the secure link, encrypted using the key shared by the two consecutive nodes (see [8] ).
To enhance the security of a path key, Chan et al. [3] and Zhu et al. [24] proposed to use multiple paths to transmit key shares. Suppose that there are m secure node disjoint paths between A and B (for a discussion on how to find such paths, see [3] ). Once n such paths are identified, A could send n key shares s 1 ; . . . ; s n to B, one share via each path. B recovers the key K as K ¼ s 1 È Á Á Á È s n . Note that the actual number of such paths can be estimated using the k-connectivity properties of a sensor network secured by key predistribution schemes (see, e.g., [3] , [23] ).
The path key establishment using K ¼ s 1 È Á Á Á È s n is vulnerable to message dropping or altering. In [24] , Zhu et al. also proposed to use an ðn; kÞ secret sharing scheme [20] to compute the shares and to recover the key. An ðn; kÞ secret sharing scheme generates n shares for a secret s. With any k of these n shares, the secret s can be recovered. The secret sharing scheme enables B to recover the key when some shares are dropped.
To withstand message dropping and altering attacks, Huang and Mehdi [10] proposed a multipath key establishment scheme (the HM scheme) based on Reed-Solomon (RS) codes. In the HM scheme, A chooses a key and encodes it in an RS codeword which consists of multiple symbols. The symbols are sent to B via multiple paths. The RS code provides error correction ability so that B can recover the key when some symbols are dropped or altered. However, we show in Section 3 that there are some deficiencies in the Huang and Mehdi scheme.
Deng and Han [5] proposed another RS-code-based multipath key establishment scheme named as Just Enough Redundancy Transmission (JERT). JERT is designed for two neighboring nodes which have a direct communication link which provides authentication but not secrecy (e.g., a broadcast channel), over which B can send feedback to A. Unlike the HM scheme, where A transmits all the symbols of a codeword at the same time, A transmits the symbols incrementally in JERT. When B has received enough symbols and recovers a key, B and A can run an authentication protocol over their direct link to verify the recovered key. Because the communication over the direct link does not involve other nodes, as in the code symbol transmission, the transmission overhead of the authentication protocol is considered free. If the key recovered by B is correct, then A will not send the remaining symbols. We analyze the JERT scheme in more detail in Section 3.
Our Contributions
We first define a model for multipath key establishment (MPKE). This model enhances the model used in [10] and [5] , which does not adequately address the question of secrecy of the established key. (As a result, the previous schemes are not secure.) Our model explicitly requires secrecy of the established key against active adversaries, and the schemes we construct are secure in this strengthened model.
Informally, there are two specific security objectives that need to be achieved:
Reliability. The adversary nodes should not be able to prevent B from computing the key K that was chosen by A.
Secrecy. From the point of view of the adversary nodes, the entropy of K (given the information that they observe) should be sufficiently high so that they cannot compute K.
Our initial observation is that the above objectives can be realized using a protocol for perfectly secure message transmission (PSMT). This connection has not been pointed out or utilized in most previous papers on the topic of MPKE (the sole exception being the 2004 paper by Wang [22] , which considers a somewhat different problem). We note that constructions and bounds for PSMT have been studied extensively since the 1993 paper of Dolev et al. [6] , and argue that this theory can be profitably applied in the context of multipath key establishment.
We then propose a new optimal protocol for one-round PSMT based on Reed-Solomon codes. Our protocol is somewhat similar to a protocol found in Fitzi et al. [9] ; however, we require only a single Reed-Solomon codeword to be generated, split into pieces and transmitted over the various channels. We believe that our scheme is the simplest optimal one-round PSMT yet proposed.
We use our new PSMT protocol to obtain two new multipath key establishment schemes that can be applied, provided that fewer than one-third of the paths are controlled by the adversary. Our first PSMT scheme works in the same setting as the HM scheme, where A does not need to receive feedback from B; it is, in fact, just a straightforward usage of PSMT for the purposes of MPKE. Our second PSMT scheme works in the same setting as JERT, where A can receive feedback from B to reduce message transmission. For this scheme, we make use of the fact that our PSMT scheme consists of transmitting a single Reed-Solomon codeword; this allows the symbols in the codeword to be transmitted incrementally, until B has obtained a sufficient number of symbols to decode the codeword correctly.
We optimize the parameters of both these MPKE schemes so that A uses the minimum transmission possible for B to recover a secure key.
Our third MPKE scheme tolerates a higher fraction (less than half) of paths controlled by the adversary. This scheme is based on a new protocol for a "weakened" version of message transmission, which is very simple and efficient. To be specific, we sacrifice unconditional security (which is required in PSMT but not in MPKE) to obtain higher tolerance of adversary nodes.
Organization
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we describe the proposed model and some results on secure message transmission, Reed-Solomon codes, and key derivation using resilient functions. In Section 3, we present and analyze the HM and JERT schemes. In Section 4, we present our first two new schemes and their analysis. In Section 5, we present our third scheme, which tolerates a less than 1/2 fraction of paths controlled by the adversary. In Section 6, we conclude the paper.
THE MODEL AND SOME PRELIMINARIES
Our model for MPKE is an enhancement of the model used in [10] and [5] . Our model is described as follows:
1. In a sensor network secured using key predistribution schemes, there often are multiple-node disjoint paths between a specified source node A and a specified destination node B. Every two consecutive nodes (i.e., a link) on such a path have a common key, and no two of these paths contain any common nodes except for A and B. These paths are identified by A before key establishment takes place (e.g., using techniques such as those described in [3] ). A sends key establishment messages over the paths. The efficiency of the scheme is measured by communication complexity, i.e., the total amount of information that is transmitted over all the paths. 2. We will assume that a fraction e of these paths (where 0 e < 1=2) is controlled by an adversary.
We call e the error rate. A path P is controlled by an adversary if there exists an adversary that has knowledge of the key corresponding to a link on the path P . 1 We assume that an adversary controlling a path P can observe, drop, or alter any messages that are transmitted from A to B using the path P .
3. The goal of a key establishment scheme is to enable A and B to establish a key with sufficient entropy. This leads to two security requirements.
1.
First, the adversary should not be able to disrupt the protocol by preventing B from computing the same key K that A holds. 2. Second, the adversary should be prevented from determining partial information about the established key. This idea is formalized by considering the entropy of the message M received by B, from the point of view of the adversary who collects partial information about M (see Section 2.2.1 for details). Note that we are building on the model used in [10] and [5] ; in particular, the first two requirements above, as well as requirement 3-1, are similar to those used in the prior works. However, the entropy of the established key is not analyzed in [10] and [5] . Entropy is a critical requirement for the established key to be secure, because a key with low entropy can easily be determined by the adversary by exhaustive search. Key entropy should be considered when evaluating the scheme, along with efficiency. This is why we have extended the model to include an explicit requirement regarding entropy of the key.
Secure Message Transmission
PSMT was introduced in 1993 by Dolev et al. [6] . We define PSMT protocols and summarize some relevant results in this section.
Suppose two parties A and B are connected by p channels. An adversary controls p a (or fewer) of these channels, but it is not known which channels are controlled by the adversary. The adversary can observe, delete, or modify the information in these p a channels. An r-round ðp; p a Þ-perfectly secure message transmission scheme is an interactive protocol between A and B which takes place in r rounds (denoted as rounds 1; . . . ; r), such that the following properties are satisfied:
1. In each odd-numbered round, A sends information to B over each of the p channels connecting them. 2. In each even-numbered round, B sends information to A over each of the p channels connecting them. 3. After the rth round, A and B both possess a common key K which is an element of a prespecified key space.
The adversary has no information on the value of K
(so the entropy of K, from the point of view of the adversary, is log jKj). The overhead of a PSMT is defined to be the ratio amount of information transmitted over all p channels length of the key K :
There is a large literature on PSMT. For our purposes, we are most interested in one-round protocols, since these are the simplest and best suited to be applied to multipath key establishment. It was proven in [6] that a one-round ðp; p a Þ-perfectly secure message transmission scheme exists if and only if p ! 3p a þ 1. It is shown in [9] that the overhead of a one-round PSMT satisfies the condition
Furthermore, for all pairs ðp; p a Þ with p ! 3p a þ 1, schemes that meet this bound with equality (i.e., optimal overhead schemes) are constructed in [9] . If 3p a ! p ! 2p a þ 1, then all is not lost. It is possible to construct two-round ðp; p a Þ-PSMT in these cases [13] , [19] . Alternatively, one can obtain one-round schemes that are not perfectly reliable (i.e., where condition 3 in the definition of PSMT is relaxed). Such schemes are constructed in [12] , [16] .
Comparison between PSMT and MPKE
A PSMT assumes multiple channels connecting A and B. The channels not controlled by the adversary are assumed to provide unconditional secrecy and authenticity. The security of a PSMT scheme is unconditional, provided that no computational assumptions are made in the analysis of the protocol. Almost all PSMT in the literature are studied in the setting of unconditional security.
In an MPKE, information is transmitted over links in encrypted form using conventional secret-key cryptography. Therefore, we do not expect an MPKE to provide unconditional security; the security will depend on the assumption that the encryption and authentication schemes are (computationally) secure. Additional computational assumptions may be required, depending on the scheme.
In summary, any PSMT can be used for MPKE, but there are reasonable and practical MPKE schemes that are not PSMT schemes.
Reed-Solomon Codes
Many PSMT protocols are based on Reed-Solomon codes, which we introduce now. There are different ways to construct RS codes. Each has its encoding and decoding algorithms. Here, we only describe the general functionalities of the encoding/decoding algorithms. For details of the algorithms, see, e.g., [18] , [11] . Simply speaking, the input of the RS encoding algorithm is a message m ¼ ðm 0 ; . . . ; m kÀ1 Þ 2 F k q , where F q is a finite field of order q. The output of an RS encoding algorithm is c ¼ ðc 0 ; . . . ; c nÀ1 Þ 2 F n q , where k n q. c is called a codeword. Each element in m or c is called a symbol.
If it always happens that c i ¼ m i for 0 i k À 1, then the encoding is systematic. In this case, m 0 ; . . . ; m kÀ1 may be called information symbols and c k ; . . . ; c nÀ1 may be called parity check symbols. Not all RS encoding schemes are systematic, however.
The above described RS code has length n and dimension k. Its distance is d ¼ n À k þ 1 (i.e., any two distinct codewords differ in at least n À k þ 1 symbols).
A Reed-Solomon code is a linear code, which means that the codewords form a k-dimensional subspace of the vector space F n q . A commonly used method of encoding a linear code is to construct a generator matrix, denoted by G, whose rows form a basis for the code. Then, to encode a message m, we compute c ¼ mG.
During transmission, some symbols in a codeword c may be deleted or altered. Suppose that of the symbols in c are deleted, and other symbols in c are altered. Let r be the resulting received vector. The input of the decoding algorithm is r. The output of the decoding algorithm is the codeword whose distance from r is minimized. It is a standard result in coding theory that this decoding algorithm will output c provided that
In the case of an RS code, we have d ¼ n À k þ 1 and the condition (2) becomes
Given any codeword c, it is a simple matter to obtain the corresponding message m, regardless of whether or not the code is systematic.
In the above described RS code, a message consists of k symbols and a codeword consists of nðn ! kÞ symbols. The code is termed as an ðn; kÞ RS code.
Evaluating the Secrecy of a Message
When RS codes are used to encode and transmit a secret message m ¼ ðm 0 ; . . . ; m kÀ1 Þ, we need to consider the entropy of m from an adversary's point of view. The original entropy of m is k log 2 q bits. Suppose that i symbols are received by the adversary. If i ! k, then the adversary can recover m and the entropy of m is 0. If i < k, then the adversary can randomly guess k À i additional symbols and recover a (possibly incorrect) message. In this case, the adversary recovers the correct message with probability 1 2 ðkÀiÞ log 2 q : Therefore, when the adversary knows i symbols in m, the entropy of m is maxfðk À iÞ log 2 q; 0g bits:
Key Derivation and Resilient Functions
In the protocols we will be describing, the key K, which is derived from a k-tuple m, should have sufficient entropy. We will use the number of symbols, instead of number of bits, to indicate the entropy. In this terminology, the entropy of a message m is k symbols.
To ensure that K is secure, we desire that m should have entropy at least ' symbols, for some prespecified value of '. There are several ways to derive K from m while preserving its entropy. For example, we can use a cryptographic hash function hash to compute K ¼ hashðmÞ. If it holds that 1. the hash function is modeled as a random oracle, 2. the input of the hash function has entropy at least ' symbols, and 3. the output of the hash function has a length of at least ' symbols, then the entropy of the derived key K is at least ' symbols (so, we say that K is '-secure).
The above approach only provides computational security of the key. An alternative is to use resilient functions [1] , [4] to derive the key. This approach would provide unconditional security of the key.
Suppose q is a prime power. Let k; '; t be positive integers such that k ! ' þ t. A ðk; '; t; qÞ-resilient function, or ðk; '; t; qÞ-RF, is a function f : F k q ! F ' q such that fðmÞ is uniformly distributed in F ' q whenever any t inputs are fixed and the remaining k À t inputs are chosen independently and uniformly at random from F q , e.g., by an adversary (here, we are regarding f as a function with k inputs from F q ).
There is a large body of literature on resilient functions. For our purposes, we need a well-known class of resilient functions that is derived from Reed-Solomon codes. In fact, any linear code gives rise to a linear function. The following was proven for binary codes in [1] , [4] . It was observed in [21] that the same result holds for codes over an arbitrary finite field. Theorem 2.1. Suppose q is a prime power, and suppose there exists a linear code over F q having length n, dimension k, and distance d. Then, there exists an ðn; k; d À 1; qÞ-RF.
Using Reed-Solomon codes, the following is an immediate corollary.
where k and ' are the positive integers. Then, there exists a ðk; '; k À '; qÞ-RF.
The construction of a ðk; '; k À '; qÞ-RF is easy. Let G be the generator matrix of a Reed-Solomon code of dimension ' and length k over F q . Then, f is defined as fðmÞ ¼ mG T , where G T denotes the transpose of G.
Remark. The above described usage of resilient functions has previously been employed in the literature on PSMT; see, for example, the function EXTRAND in [16, Section 4.2] . However, surprisingly, the connection to resilient functions is not made in [16] or in other papers on PSMT.
ANALYSIS OF THE HM AND JERT SCHEMES
In this section, we analyze the HM and JERT schemes. The HM scheme does not achieve its stated objectives, and moreover, it is insecure. The main problem with the JERT scheme is that the security is not proved under a strong enough adversarial model.
The HM Scheme
The HM scheme [10] is as follows: Let n À k ¼ 2t. The number of paths controlled by the adversary is assumed to be at most t. Then, A creates kð2t þ 1Þ-tuples, each of the form m i k b, and sends at most t of the ð2t þ 1Þ-tuples on each of the p-node disjoint paths (note that this requires that k pt, which is not stated as a necessary condition in [10] ).
Since there are at most t paths that are controlled by the adversary and p > 2t, B can use majority rule to find the correct b. It is then claimed in [10] that B can then recover m, but ability to recover m also depends on how many information symbols have been altered by the adversary. In fact, we show that B may not be able to recover m at all in many situations. Suppose k > p > 2t (note that it is assumed that 2t < p k, so we are just saying that k 6 ¼ p). Suppose that each message symbol is transmitted by one path. Then, there is at least one of the p paths, say P 0 , that is used to transmit at least two message symbols. If P 0 is one of the t paths controlled by the adversary, then the adversary can alter at least t þ 1 message symbols. However, an RS code can only correct t errors, so the message cannot be recovered by B.
Another problem with the scheme in [10] is that adversary can obtain information about the message. Recall that the scheme is supposed to tolerate up to t compromised paths. However, if t paths are controlled by the adversary, then the adversary receives 2t correct parity check symbols and at least t correct information symbols, and hence, by (3), the adversaries collectively are able to recover m when 3t ! k (equivalently, when n 5t). Even when there is only one adversary node, it will receive 2t parity check symbols and at least one information symbol. Then, the entropy of the key is maxfk À 2t À 1; 0g symbols, which could be very low.
We regard it as a weakness in the scheme for A to send all the 2t parity check symbols on every path, because for decoding of RS codes, a parity check symbol yields the same amount of information about the message as an information symbol does. Another problem (as noted in [5] ) is that the scheme is quite inefficient due to the amount of repeated information that is transmitted.
The JERT Scheme
JERT [5] is designed for two neighboring nodes that have a direct channel that provides message integrity but not secrecy, e.g., a broadcast channel. In this case, A and B can run a challenge response authentication protocol over this insecure channel to verify if they share a common secret key. The communication overhead over the direct link is neglected in the analysis of the efficiency of the scheme.
Here are the details of the scheme. A chooses m ¼ ðm 0 ; . . . ; m kÀ1 Þ, encodes it into a codeword c ¼ ðc 0 ; . . . ; c nÀ1 Þ, and derives a key K from m. Then, A selects p-node disjoint paths between A and B. A divides the n symbols into R groups. Group j contains r j symbols. It holds that X R j¼1 r j ¼ n:
A sends the n symbols in R rounds. In round j, the r j symbols in group j are sent over the p paths. For each path i, A computes fraction parameters q i (0 q i 1), where X p i¼1 q i ¼ 1:
Then, A sends r j q i symbols over path i in round j. In each round, if B can recover an m 0 using all the received symbols, then B derives a key K 0 from m 0 and runs an authentication protocol with A over their direct link to verify if K ¼ K 0 . A keeps on sending the codeword symbols until the authentication protocol indicates that K 0 ¼ K or until all n symbols are sent.
The main purpose JERT is for A to send just enough symbols for B to recover K, instead of transmitting all symbols as in the HM scheme. JERT may be thought of as an adaptive algorithm, whereas HM is nonadaptive.
The security analysis in [5] discusses three attack scenarios:
1. All adversary nodes are passive. In this case, the probability that a given fraction of the symbols is received by the adversary is computed. 2. All adversary nodes are active. In this case, the number of symbols that must be sent so that B can recover the key is computed. 3. Some adversary nodes are active and some are passive. This case is not analyzed in [5] , where it is stated that an analysis of this case "would be quite complex." We believe that an adequate security model should consider any combination of active and passive adversaries.
TWO NEW SCHEMES FOR MPKE BASED ON REED-SOLOMON CODES
In our schemes, we consider all possible attack scenarios. First, the adversary nodes cannot make B accept an incorrect key, even if all the adversary nodes are active. Therefore, since B learns the correct key K, we only need to consider how much information the adversary nodes can derive about K. For this analysis, we allow adversary nodes to be active or passive.
In this section, we propose two multipath key establishment schemes: Protocol 1 and Protocol 2. These protocols are obtained from a new and extremely simple PSMT protocol based on ðn; kÞ RS codes. In Protocol 1, as in the HM scheme, A does not receive feedback from B. In Protocol 2, as in the JERT scheme, A receives feedback from B. For both schemes, we are interested in finding the optimal choice of ðn; kÞ values such that B can recover a key with the desired entropy, while A only transmits the minimum possible number of bits (i.e., the transmission overhead is optimized).
As mentioned above, our schemes are based on RS codes over finite field F q . We assume that q is fixed and q ! n in the chosen ðn; kÞ RS code.
Protocol 1
Here are the details of our first MPKE protocol, which is, in fact, a one-round PSMT scheme if the parameters are chosen appropriately. We refer to this protocol as Protocol 1.
1.
A chooses a random message m ¼ ðm 0 ; . . . ; m kÀ1 Þ 2 F k q and encodes it into an RS codeword c ¼ ðc 0 ; . . . ; c nÀ1 Þ 2 F n q .
2.
A sends the n codeword symbols over p prespecified node disjoint paths. Note that the number of symbols sent over any path is either d n p e or b n p c. 3. B decodes the received symbols to a codeword c 0 .
Then, a message m 0 is derived from c 0 . Finally, a key K 0 is derived from m 0 using a prespecified key derivation function. We discuss feasible and optimal choices of ðn; kÞ values in Section 4.1.1.
Remark. When B receives a symbol c i , B also needs to know its index i for decoding purposes (this applies to the HM scheme and JERT as well). This objective could be accomplished, for example, if A and B have some synchronization mechanism. In any event, we assume that B has some reliable means of knowing the index of any received symbol.
Analysis and Optimization
Our goal is that the key K (derived from m) has entropy ' symbols if m has entropy at least ' symbols. We will derive conditions to ensure that m has entropy at least ' symbols. Then, the key derivation function is just a ðk; '; k À '; qÞ-RF, obtained from Corollary 2.2. This would provide A and B with an unconditionally secure key in F ' q . Suppose there are p-node disjoint paths from A to B and p a of these paths are controlled by the adversary. Therefore, the error rate is e ¼ p a =p. For simplicity, assume that n=p is an integer. Then, in Protocol 1, n=p Â p a ¼ ne symbols will be received by adversary nodes. These ne symbols may be altered or deleted.
First, we derive a condition to ensure reliability (i.e., so that B can correctly compute the key K). Since altering symbols makes it most difficult for B to recover m, we assume that these ne symbols are all altered. For B to be able to correctly recover m, the condition (3) becomes
Observe that (4) implies that ne < n=2, so e < 1=2.
Remark. If the scheme satisfies (4), then it is already a perfectly reliable message transmission scheme (for a definition, see [16] ). Now, we consider secrecy of the transmitted message. In order for m to have entropy at least ' symbols, we require that
Using the fact that the desired entropy ' > 0, it can be seen that (4) and (5) together imply that
which yields e < 1=3, so hereinafter we assume that e < 1=3.
(Recall from Section 2.1 that e < 1=3 is a necessary condition for a one-round perfectly secure message transmission scheme to exist.) Under this assumption, (4) and (5) are equivalent to
The inequalities in (6) provide the conditions under which B can compute a key with entropy at least ' symbols. Note that (6) can equivalently be expressed as follows:
Suppose a value ' is fixed. Then, we define an ordered pair ðn; kÞ to be e-feasible if (6) (equivalently, (7)) is satisfied.
Given ' and e, the set of all e-feasible ordered pairs forms a region, a typical example of which is indicated by the shadowed area in Fig. 1 . The optimal solution will be an ordered pair of integers ðn; kÞ that is close to the ordered pair ðn min ; k min Þ, which denotes the intersection of the two lines k ¼ nð1 À 2eÞ and k ¼ ' þ ne. It is easy to compute
Clearly, n min > 0 and k min > 0 because e < 1=3. n min represents the optimal transmission size in the protocol. Suppose ðn; kÞ is e-feasible. Finally, suppose that there are p disjoint paths from A to B, where p a ¼ pe of these paths are controlled by the adversary. Suppose that n=p is an integer. Then, Protocol 1 yields an '-secure secret key. The total transmission of Protocol 1 consists of n symbols.
If we apply Protocol 1 with ðn; kÞ ¼ ðn min ; k min Þ, then the transmission overhead is
which is optimal, by (1). Protocol 1 is analyzed in terms of the error rate e. In general, the error rate will not be known. In practice, Alice and Bob would choose a value e Ã < 1=3 which they hope is an upper bound on e. They would then execute Protocol 1 with an e Ã -feasible ordered pair ðn; kÞ. It is easy to see that an e Ã -feasible ordered pair is also e-feasible, provided that 0 e e Ã , so Protocol 1 will still work correctly in these circumstances.
Example. Suppose that e ¼ 1=5, p ¼ 5, and ' ¼ 40. Then, we can take n ¼ 100 and k ¼ 40 in Theorem 4.1. That is, we obtain a 40-secure key using a ð100; 40Þ RS code under the assumption that at most one of five-node disjoint paths joining A and B is controlled by the adversary. 
Protocol 2
In Protocol 1, if the actual error rate e < e Ã , then the protocol might transmit more information than is actually necessary, i.e., the efficiency might not be optimal. To reduce the number of transmitted symbols, A can use feedback from B. This idea was first proposed in JERT [5] . JERT is designed for two neighboring nodes that can communicate directly. It is assumed that the channel connecting A and B is a broadcast channel. Therefore, it provides data integrity, but no confidentiality or data origin authentication. The lack of confidentiality or authentication is not a problem, as this channel is used only for message authentication. We assume a similar channel in our protocol. Next, we define Protocol 2, where B will send feedback to A using the broadcast channel. Let e Ã be the maximum error rate that the protocol is designed for (i.e., an e Ãfeasible ordered pair ðn; kÞ is chosen for use in the protocol). As before, assume that there are p-node disjoint paths from A to B and assume for convenience that p j n. In Protocol 2, MAC denotes a secure message authentication protocol.
1.
A chooses a random message m ¼ ðm 0 ; . . . ; m kÀ1 Þ 2 F k q and encodes it into an RS codeword c ¼ ðc 0 ; . . . ; c nÀ1 Þ 2 F n q . 2. In each of n=p rounds, A sends one codeword symbol over each of the p prespecified node disjoint paths. 3. After each round, B attempts to decode the symbols he has received in the current and all previous rounds to a codeword c 0 . If he is successful, then a message m 0 is derived from c 0 and a key K 0 is derived from m 0 using the key derivation function. 4. If B is able to compute a (possible) key K 0 , then B initiates a conventional message authentication code (MAC)-based mutual authentication protocol with A over the broadcast channel. In the protocol, A and B both verify if they hold the same key. If the authentication succeeds, then both A and B stop. Since we assumed that the broadcast channel provides integrity, the adversary is not able to change the messages between A and B in the authentication protocol. If A and B have the same key, then the adversary is not able to prevent the authentication from succeeding.
Analysis
First, we consider the properties of security and reliability. We claim that Protocol 2 is computationally secure whenever the mutual authentication protocol used in step 4 is computationally secure. It is certainly possible that B computes an incorrect key, but he will not accept a wrong key (except with very small probability) due to the mutual authentication protocol used in step 4 to prove possession of the new key. Eventually, after some number of rounds, B will be able to compute the correct key provided that e e Ã (for details, see below). Therefore, Protocol 2 achieves reliability. Secrecy follows from the same analysis as for Protocol 1. Protocol 2 is also secure against mobile adversaries. (A mobile adversary is allowed to compromise different nodes in different rounds, subject to the constraint that the error rate is at most e Ã in any given round.)
Next, we analyze the efficiency of Protocol 2 by determining the number of rounds required for B to be able to compute the correct key K. After r rounds, B has received rp symbols, at most rpe of which have been altered. The number of symbols which have not yet been transmitted to B is n À pr. Thus, B has a received vector in which per and ¼ n À pr. Referring to (3), B can correctly decode this received vector if 2rpe þ n À pr n À k;
which is equivalent to
Therefore, the correct key is computed by B after at most dk=ðpð1 À 2eÞÞe rounds. It follows that the speedup factor of Protocol 2 as compared to Protocol 1 is
If e ¼ e Ã , then the number of rounds required is dk=ðpð1 À 2e Ã ÞÞe. If e ¼ 0, then the number of rounds required is dk=pe.
Summarizing the above discussion, we have the following theorem:
Suppose ' is a positive integer and 0 < e e Ã < 1=3 and suppose ðn; kÞ is e Ã -feasible. Suppose that there are p disjoint paths from A to B, where p a ¼ pe of these paths are controlled by the adversary. Then, Protocol 2 yields an '-secure secret key. The total transmission of Protocol 2 consists of (roughly) nð1 À 2e Ã Þ=ð1 À 2eÞ symbols.
Remark. In practice, B would not attempt to decode the received vector after every round. The exact error rate e ¼ p a =p, where p a pe Ã is an integer. Using (9) , we see that it is sufficient for B to decode a received vector only when a round r has the form
; for some integer i ! 0.
A SCHEME TOLERATING ERROR RATE < 1=2
Both of our protocols described in Section 4 assume that the number of paths controlled by the adversary is less than a 1=3 fraction of the number of paths connecting A and B. A higher fraction (less than half) of paths controlled by the adversary could be tolerated by using appropriate message transmission schemes mentioned in Section 2.1. These schemes either require additional rounds of communication or they are not perfectly reliable. They are also somewhat complicated and/or inefficient. In this section, we present a new two-round protocol for a weakened version of message transmission which is very simple and efficient, and well suited for application as an MPKE scheme. Our protocol will be computationally secure provided that certain specified ingredients exist.
Our scheme has the following properties:
. We assume that A and B are joined by p-node disjoint paths, at most p a of which are controlled the adversary, where p ! 2p a þ 1. . We require a mapping h : K ! T , where K is the key component space and T is the tag space. We will take K ¼ F q for some prime power q ! p. . The scheme will be perfectly reliable if h is injective (in this case, the scheme enables A and B to establish a shared key K 2 K with probability equal to one independent of any computational assumptions). . The scheme will be (computationally) reliable if h is second-preimage resistant. . Under the assumption that h is a random function, the scheme provides secrecy of the established key.
(For a random function, a computationally bounded adversary is unable to compute any non-negligible information about a secret value L, when the adversary is given only the value hðLÞ.) . The scheme is a two-round scheme.
Here is the protocol, which we term Protocol 3. a. A determines accept, as it will be correctly received over at least p À p a paths (i.e., a majority of the paths). b. A computes m and K exactly as B did.
Remark. As described above, Protocol 3 is not a message transmission scheme due to the fact that the value of the derived key K is not specified a priori its value depends on possible actions of the adversary. This is sufficient for the goals of an MPKE scheme. However, if desired, it is easy to use a standard trick to make a minor alteration to our scheme in order to transmit a predetermined key K Ã from A to B. Namely, the protocol would be initiated by B (instead of A), and in the second round, A would send K Ã þ K to B along with accept.
Remark. In practice, we could take h to be a secondpreimage resistant and one-way hash function. Another alternative is to let h be a semantically secure public key cryptosystem with randomly chosen public key, in which case h would be injective.
Analysis
First, we show that if B accepts a key component L i , then it was not altered by the adversary. Suppose that the adversary replaces L i by a different value L 0 i . Assuming that h is injective, we have that hðL 0 i Þ 6 ¼ hðL i Þ. In order for the adversary to make B accept L 0 i (in step 3b), he would have to change at least p À p a À 1 of the p À 1 values h i;j (j 6 ¼ i). But if the adversary controls p i , then the adversary controls at most p a À 1 of the other p À 1 paths. We have p a À 1 < p À p a À 1 because p ! 2p a þ 1. Therefore, in this situation, the scheme is perfectly reliable.
If h is not injective but it is second-preimage resistant, then a computationally bounded adversary is unable to find L 0 i such that hðL 0 i Þ ¼ hðL i Þ, even if such L 0 i exist. The scheme is (computationally) reliable in this case.
It remains to evaluate the secrecy of the derived key K. First, we observe that if the adversary does not control the ith path, then he cannot determine any information about the key component L i . This is because we are assuming that h is a random mapping. Now, let r denote the number of rejected key components; r ¼ p À a. Any rejected key component lies on a path controlled by the adversary. Therefore, the number of accepted key components that lie on paths controlled by the adversary is at most p a À r ¼ n À ðp À p a Þ. Now, the n-tuple m contains at most n À ðp À p a Þ components that are known to the adversary. Hence, application of an ðn; p À p a ; n À ðp À p a Þ; qÞ-resilient function will yield a key whose entropy is p À p a symbols. This resilient function exists by Corollary 2.2.
Finally, A is also able to compute K because A is able to correctly determine the set accept after receiving p copies of it from B (at most p a of these copies are altered by the adversary, so the correct accept can be determined by majority rule).
Let's next analyze the transmission overhead of the scheme. For the purpose of this analysis, assume that jKj is ÂðjT jÞ. Then, the derived key has entropy p À p a symbols and the total transmission from A to B is Âðp 2 Þ symbols. The total transmission from B to A is p 2 bits (the set accept can be represented as a bitstring of length p). Since q ! p, this is at most p symbols. So, the total transmission is Âðp 2 Þ symbols, and the transmission overhead is at most Â p 2 p À p a :
Since p À p a > p=2, the transmission overhead is ÂðpÞ.
Theorem 5.1. Suppose ' is a positive integer and 0 e < 1=2.
Suppose that there are p disjoint paths from A to B, where p a ¼ pe of these paths are controlled by the adversary. Then, Protocol 3 yields a ðp À p a Þ-secure secret key. The total transmission of Protocol 3 consists of Âðp 2 Þ symbols, and the transmission overhead is ÂðpÞ.
SUMMARY
We proposed an enhanced security model to capture attacks against multipath key establishment schemes in sensor networks. We identified two security objectives, which we term reliability and secrecy, that should be achieved. We observed that these objectives could be realized using perfectly secure message transmission schemes. Next, we proposed a new optimal one-round PSMT scheme using Reed-Solomon codes and constructed two new multipath key establishment schemes based on it. Both MPKE schemes achieve the desired objectives in an efficient manner. The second protocol potentially reduces the communication complexity in some cases by using feedback involving a message authentication code. Both of these protocols assume that the number of adversary-controlled paths is less than a 1=3 fraction of the number of paths connecting A and B.
Finally, we described another MPKE scheme that tolerates a higher fraction (less than half) of paths controlled by the adversary. This scheme is based on a new protocol for a weakened version of message transmission, which is very simple and efficient. . For more information on this or any other computing topic, please visit our Digital Library at www.computer.org/publications/dlib.
